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IV 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In this case, Habib Sadid (hereafter "Sadid") alleges that the Idaho Industrial Commission 
(hereafter "Commission") incorrectly decided that he was terminated by his former employer, 
Respondent Idaho State University (hereafter "ISU"), for employment-related misconduct and, 
therefore, was ineligible for unemployment benefits. 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Sadid appeals from the Commission's DECISION AND ORDER ON 
RECONSIDERATION entered on January 20,2011 which reversed the Appeals Examiner's 
Decision of January 27, 2010. CR., p. 297). 
B. THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Following the termination of Appellant's employment, Sadid applied for unemployment 
benefits. He was deemed ineligible for unemployment benefits by the Idaho Department of 
Labor (hereafter "IDOL") on December 3, 2009 because the Appeals Examiner found that he was 
terminated for employment-related misconduct. CR., p. 1). Sadid appealed the original 
determination.! On December 22, 2009, the IDOL mailed out a notice of the appeals hearing 
scheduled for January 4, 2010. As all ISU offices were closed from December 23rd until January 
4th, ISU did not receive notice of the hearing in time to participate. (R., pp. 10-14). 
At the hearing before the IDOL, Sadid did not challenge the facts which ISU contends 
were cause for his termination. He asserted that the letters of reprimand and other complaints 
about his conduct and behavior were simply an attempt by ISU to lay a paper trail to cover ISU's 
!When Sadid requested an appeal hearing, he acknowledged his behavior, but asserted that the real reason 
that he was fIred was for the exercise of "protected speech" in articles appearing in the Idaho State Journal 
over the past decade. 
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retaliation against him for his protected speech. (T., 17). Sadid's testimony regarding the Notice 
of Contemplated Action related to his behavior at the April 21, 2009 faculty meeting confirmed 
that the behavior in fact occurred, however he merely attempted to justify his conduct on various 
grounds. (T., 19-20). Sadid continued to assert that the real reason for his termination was 
retaliation for his protected speech. (T., 14-19). When he was asked directly whether cause for 
termination existed by the Appeals Examiner, Sadid simply said, "no." (T., 25). 
The Appeals Examiner held in favor of Sadid on the grounds that all of the documents 
submitted by lSU were "hearsay," which could not support a factual finding, while Sadid's 
uncontroverted oral testimony was sufficient to justify a finding in his favor. lSU made a request 
for a rehearing to offer evidence, which request was denied. lSU filed a claim for review before 
the Commission and requested an evidentiary hearing, which was also denied. (R.,48-52). 
However, on review, the Commission did admit and consider lSU's documentary evidence that 
was excluded at the prior appeal hearing. CR. pp. 130, 135-36). 
The Commission found that lSU clearly expressed to Sadid its standards of expected 
behavior, which the Commission found were objectively reasonable. CR., p. 138). The 
Commission found that Sadid's behavior at the April 21, 2009 faculty meeting, as evidenced by 
the transcript provided by Sadid, violated lSU's standards of behavior and rendered him 
ineligible for unemployment benefits. (R., pp. 138-40). 
Sadid filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that it was improper for the 
Commission to consider only the transcript of the April 21,2009 meeting and that it should have 
reviewed the audio recording. (R., pp. 142,147). The Commission granted the Motion for 
Reconsideration. (R., p. 169). Following further briefing, and a de novo review of the record, 
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the Commission entered its Decision and Order on Reconsideration affirming that Sadid was 
terminated for employment-related misconduct and was ineligible for unemployment benefits. 
(R., pp. 297-308). Sadid then filed this appeal. (R., pp. 309-12). 
C. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Pre-termination Facts. 
Sadid was a tenured professor of engineering at ISU at the time of his termination. He 
had a lengthy history of conflict with colleagues and multiple university administrations. Sadid 
was unabashed in repeatedly raising his job related disagreements with administrators in the form 
of accusations of unethical or criminal misconduct against those ISU officials with whom he 
disagreed. Those complaints about his work conditions and resulting accusations were often 
made through comments at faculty meetings, or in emails distributed to large numbers of faculty 
members and administrators throughout ISU. The continued disruption of normal college 
business due to the comments and accusations made by Sadid in such manner led to the issuance 
of two warning letters sent to him by ISU in April 2009, which letters notified him to raise his 
employment related concerns through proper channels, and not in faculty meetings or widely-
distributed emails, or otherwise in ways which tended to expose colleagues to public hatred, 
contempt, or ridicule, or to impeach their integrity or reputation. The letters specifically notified 
Sadid that his failure to observe proper channels could result in disciplinary action. 
In spite of the written warnings from his employer, Sadid continued his disruptive and 
abusive communications and carried those over into a faculty meeting which occurred on April 
21, 2009. The meeting was attended by the new Provost oflSU and was his first meeting with 
the faculty of the College of Engineering. No topic on the meeting agenda even remotely related 
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to Sadid's concerns. Sadid repeatedly disrupted the meeting with accusations against current and 
former administrators and with personal concerns about his job performance evaluations, in spite 
of past warnings not to disrupt such meetings with his personal issues, and despite even being 
admonished not to do so during that particular faculty meeting. 
As the result of Sadid' s disregard ofISU's stated and reasonable expectations, the Dean 
of the College of Engineering issued a Notice of Contemplated Action directed to Sadid on May 
6, 2009. (Ex. 5, p.22). The Notice cited a specific prior instance of "unprofessional, non-
collegial, disruptive and insubordinate" behavior; a prior warning against such behavior; specific 
warnings at the time of the behavior (the meeting recorded in Exhibit 10F); a long history of 
disruptive and defamatory behavior; and a similarly long history of refusing to comply with 
instructions and counseling from his superiors. The Notice invited Sadid to meet with the Dean 
to discuss any reason, evidence or information in opposition or mitigation to the contemplated 
action. The meeting was held, but Sadid failed to dispel the Dean's reasonable belief that the 
contemplated action was necessary and warranted. 
Notably, while the decision on the Dean's recommendation was pending, Sadid continued 
to engage in behavior contrary to the university's stated and reasonable expectations. In June of 
2009, in comments to College of Engineering staff members, he accused the Dean oflying under 
oath in proceedings related to a lawsuit that he had filed. He then distributed to the entire 
College of Engineering faculty defamatory cartoons on the subject. (Ex. 3, pp. 12-15). He also 
engaged in unauthorized purchases in violation of university policies and procedures, which he 
had also twice previously been warned against making. (Ex. 6, pp. 15-25) His response to an 
additional warning was to accuse ISU of "retaliation". (Ex. 6, p 17). 
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On August 4,2009, ISU President Arthur Vailas accepted the recommendation of the 
Dean and placed Sadid on administrative leave with pay in accordance with ISU's policies. (Ex. 
5, p. 2). Sadid was given a pre-termination hearing in front of a panel of faculty members, also 
in accordance with ISU policies, which was authorized to provide Sadid an opportunity to be 
heard and to give a non-binding advisory opinion to President Vailas. The hearing was held over 
a period of several days in September/October of 2009. Although the faculty panel advised 
against termination, it was not on the grounds that Sadid's behavior was in conformity with 
ISU's reasonable expectations, but rather, because they believed Sadid had not been given 
adequate notice or a full opportunity to correct his inappropriate behavior. President Vailas 
concluded it was necessary to terminate Sadid's employment with ISU for the reasons set forth in 
the Notice of Contemplated Action dated May 6, 2009 (Ex. 5, p. 22) as well as the 
Recommendation of Dismissal dated August 3, 2009 (Ex. 5, p. 15), both of which describe in 
detail Sadid's employment-related misconduct. 
2. Post-termination Facts. 
After considering Sadid's application for unemployment benefits, as well as the findings 
of the Appeals Examiner, the Commission entered its final Decision and Order on 
Reconsideration (R., pp. 298-99), which set forth the following pertinent factual findings: 
2. Claimant had a history of voicing concerns via emails and 
at faculty meetings. On April 6,2009, Claimant received a warning 
letter from the Chair of the Department of Civil and Environmental 
Engineering informing Claimant to raise his concerns via the 
proper procedure. Claimant was to first discuss the matter with the 
Chair of the Department, then to the Dean of the College of 
Engineering, the to Employer's upper administration. 
3. Employer sent another letter on April 15, 2009, again 
warning Claimant that voicing his concerns at faculty and campus-
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wide meetings and through widely disbursed emails and 
communication intended to expose another individual to public 
hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to impeach his or her integrity or 
reputation was not appropriate. The letter, again, reminded 
Claimant to utilize proper procedures raising his concerns. 
4. At an April 21, 2009 faculty meeting, Claimant again raised 
concerns about work and personal matters, and expressed criticism 
of the administration. 
5. Dean Jacobsen issued a Notice of Contemplated Action due 
to Claimant's continued pattern of behavior. 
6. After further review, the University President, Dr. Vailas, 
discharged Claimant. 
The Commission made the following additional factual findings in the "Discussion" 
section of the Decision and Order on Reconsideration: 
"Employer discharged Claimant for a myriad of reasons, including 
insubordination and for being disruptive and unprofessional. 
(Exhibit 5, pp. 19-20). Due to Claimant's ongoing behavior, 
Employer believed that it had adequate cause to discharge 
Claimant. ... Employer's decision to discharge Claimant was based 
on its policies which state that discipline is warranted if acts or 
omissions directly and substantially affect or impair an employee's 
performance of his or her profession or assigned duties or the 
interest of the Board, or constitutes conduct that is seriously 
prejudicial to the University. (Exhibit 5, p. 15); (R., pp. 299-300). 
"Employer contends that Claimant's conduct of openly criticizing 
the administration in widely dispersed emails, faculty meetings, 
and social functions constitutes misconduct. Employer informed 
Claimant of the proper protocol to raise his concerns." ( R., p. 303) 
The Commission quoted at length from the two letters given by 
ISU to Dr. Sadid (Exhibit 3, p. 28, and Exhibit 4, p. 32). 
"Claimant did not rebut that he received the letters at hearing, and 
referred to receiving the letters in his correspondence with 
Employer. ... This information clearly shows that Employer 
informed Claimant of the proper procedure to express his concerns 
and that making statements that 'expose another individual to 
public hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to impeach his or her 
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integrity or reputation are not appropriate' and should not be made 
in faculty or campus-wide meetings or in widely-distributed 
emails." ( R., p. 304). 
"Employer's expectation is objectively reasonable under these 
circumstances." ( R., p. 304) The Commission found that ISU's 
concerns were well-founded that Sadid's actions could impair or 
affect the interest of the university by creating a negative 
atmosphere and impairing fundraising. (Id). 
"It is important to note that Employer did not forbid Claimant from 
raising his concerns. Rather, Employer required Claimant to raise 
his issues through a certain procedure. There is nothing inherently 
inappropriate about the procedure required by Employer, nor does 
Claimant directly attack the validity of the procedure at hearing. 
Therefore, Employer's expectation is reasonable." (R., p. 304). 
"After a review of the audio recording of the April 21, 2009 
[meeting], the Commission finds that Claimant did violate the 
standard of behavior which Employer expected." (R., p. 304). 
Reviewing the recording, the Commission found that Sadid 
accused the ISU administration of corruption, lying, "isolating the 
faculty," "doing nothing," refusing to communicate, being 
unethical, being "power hungers," and working to protect their own 
interests and not those of the public. Sadid expressly questioned 
the integrity and honesty of the administration in the College of 
Engineering and the University. (R., p. 305). 
"The Commission concludes that the statements made by Claimant 
in the faculty meeting represent the type of conduct that Employer 
warned Claimant of in the April 6 and 15, 2009 letters. Claimant's 
statements raised personal concerns and attack members of the 
administration in a faculty meeting. Employer contends that the 
faculty meeting had a set agenda, which did not include Claimant's 
statement or the subject matter. Employer's expectation was clear 
that such matters should be raised through proper channels and not 
at faculty meetings, the record demonstrates that Claimant's 
conduct during the April 21, 2009, faculty meeting fell below 
Employer's reasonable and communicated expectation." (R., pp. 
305-06). 
( R., pp. 299-306). 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court only reviews questions of law in an appeal from a decision of the 
Commission, disturbing findings of fact on appeal only where they are not supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. Davis v. Howard 0. Miller Co., 107 Idaho 1092, 1094, 695 
P.2d 1231,1233 (1984); see also Super Grade, Inc. v.ldaho DOC, 144 Idaho 386, 389,162 P.3d 
765, 768 (2007) (noting that "If supported by the evidence, and in the absence of fraud, the 
Commission's findings shall be conclusive and the jurisdiction of the Court shall be confined to 
questions of law"). The Court recently re-stated its standard of review on an appeal from the 
Industrial Commission as follows: 
"On appeal from the Industrial Commission, this Court exercises 
free review of the Commission's legal conclusions, but will not 
disturb findings of fact if they are supported by substantial and 
competent evidence." Steen v. Denny's Rest., 135 Idaho 234,235, 
16 P.3d 910, 911 (2000). "Substantial and competent evidence is 
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a 
conclusion." Uhl v. Ballard Med. Prods., 138 Idaho 653,657,67 
P.3d 1265, 1269 (2003). "The conclusions reached by the Industrial 
Commission regarding the credibility and weight of evidence will 
not be disturbed unless the conclusions are clearly erroneous." 
Excel! Constr., Inc. v. State, Dept. a/Labor, 141 Idaho 688,692, 
116 P.3d 18,22 (2005) (citing Hughen v. Highland Ests., 137 
Idaho 349, 351, 48 P.3d 1238, 1240 (2002)). We will not re-weigh 
the evidence or consider whether we would have drawn a different 
conclusion from the evidence presented. Id. 




A. THE COMMISSION PROPERLY REVERSED THE APPEALS EXAMINER 
DENYING UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS ON THE BASIS THAT THE 
DISCHARGE WAS DUE TO MISCONDUCT. 
1. The Commission Applied The Correct Legal Standards In Deciding That 
The Discharge Was For Employment-Related Misconduct. 
An unemployment insurance benefit claimant is ineligible for benefits if his discharge 
was the result of employment-related misconduct. I.C. § 72-1366(5). What constitutes "just 
cause" in the mind of the employer for dismissing an employee is not necessarily the legal 
equivalent of "misconduct" under Idaho's Employment Security Law. The two issues are 
separate and distinct. In a discharge, the only concern is whether the reason for the discharge 
constituted "misconduct" connected with the claimant's employment such that the claimant can 
be denied unemployment benefits. Beaty v. City o/Idaho Falls, 110 Idaho 891, 892, 719 P.2d 
1151, 1152 (1986). 
This Court has defined "misconduct", as used in I.C. § 72-1366(5), as a willful, 
intentional disregard of the employer's interests; a deliberate violation of the employer's rules; or 
a disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of his employees; 
Gunter v. Magic Valley Reg 'I Med. Ctr., 143 Idaho 63, 137 P.3d 450 (2006). The Commission is 
to consider all three tests in determining whether misconduct exists. Dietz v. Minidoka County 
Highway Dist., 127 Idaho 246, 248, 899 P.2d 956, 958 (1995). 
The Commission determines whether the employee's behavior fell below the standard 
expected by the employer, and whether the employer's expectation was objectively reasonable. 
Taylor v. Burley Care Ctr., 121 Idaho 792, 793; 828 P.2d 821, 822 (1991); Matthews v. Bucyrus-
Erie Co., 101 Idaho 657, 659,619 P.2d 1110, 1112 (1980). The Commission does not decide 
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what the standard should be, but what it is, based on those expectations that "flow normally 
from an employment relationship" and those additional expectations that are communicated to 
the employee. Davis v. Howard 0. Miller Co., 107 Idaho 1092, 1094,695 P.2d 1231,1233 
(1984) (emphasis added). 
"An employer's expectations are ordinarily reasonable only where they have been 
communicated to the employee". Folks v. Moscow Sch. Dist. #281, 129 Idaho 833, 838, 933 
P.2d 642, 647 (1997). There is no requirement that an employer demonstrate that the employee's 
behavior was subjectively willful, intentional, or deliberate in his or her disregard of the 
employer's expectations. Welch v. Cowles Pub!. Co., 127 Idaho 361,364,900 P.2d 1372, 1375 
(1995). Again, whether an employee's behavior constitutes misconduct is a factual 
determination that will be upheld unless not supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
Gunter v. Magic Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr., supra, at 65-66, 453-54. 
In the Decision and Order on Reconsideration, the Commission carefully considered all 
three grounds for determining misconduct, (R., p. 301), and correctly found that ISU carried its 
burden of showing that its reason for terminating Sadid was his employment-related misconduct. 
Parker v. St. Maries Plywood, 101 Idaho 415, 419, 614 P.2d 955,959 (1980). The Commission 
properly noted that ISU had notified Sadid of its expectation that he follow proper protocols in 
addressing his personal concerns in the April of 2009 warning letters and that Sadid did not rebut 
his receipt of those letters. (R., pp. 303-04). The Commission correctly found that ISU's 
expectation of Sadid was reasonable under the circumstances because Sadid's behavior could 
impair the interests of the university by creating a negative and disruptive atmosphere internally 
and also because it could hamper fundraising efforts due to negative perception created by such 
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behavior. (R., p. 304). The fact that ISU provided a procedure for Sadid to voice his concerns, 
and did not forbid him from speaking out on his personal grievances, was correctly emphasized 
by the Commission in its assessment that ISU's expectation was reasonable. (Id). Finally, the 
Commission properly focused on whether Sadid' s behavior at the April 21, 2009 meeting 
violated the "standard-of-behavior" expressed and warned about in ISU's previous letters, 
finding that it did. (R., pp. 304-06). 
2. The Invitation For This Court To Re-Weigh The Evidence On Appeal 
Should Be Declined. 
Sadid is improperly requesting that the Court re-weight the evidence considered by the 
Commission on this appeal. Again, this Court has made clear that "The conclusions reached by 
the Industrial Commission regarding the credibility and weight of evidence will not be disturbed 
unless the conclusions are clearly erroneous"2 and "we will not re-weigh the evidence or consider 
whether we would have drawn a different conclusion from the evidence presented".3 Id. As 
Sadid has failed to challenge the Commission's factual findings, let alone show that such factual 
findings were clearly erroneous, the Commission's factual findings should be accepted and the 
Decision and Order on Reconsideration should be affirmed. 
3. Based Upon Substantial And Competent Evidence, The Commission 
Correctly Found That The Termination Was For Employment-Related 
Misconduct. 
The undisputed evidence in the record confirms that ISU communicated to Sadid its 
reasonable expectations for his behavior, particularly when it sent the two separate warning 
2Giltner, Inc., v. Idaho Dep 't of Commerce & Labor, supra, at 418, 1074 citing Excel! Constr., Inc. v. State, 
Dept. of Labor, 141 Idaho 688, 692, 116 P.3d 18,22 (2005) (citing Hughen v. Highland Ests., 137 Idaho 
349,351,48 P.3d 1238, 1240 (2002). 
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letters in April of2009. On appeal, Sadid is essentially arguing that the Commission should have 
ignored lSU's reasonable and stated expectations in favor of Sa did's subjective and unsupported 
belief as to what behavior is appropriate in the academic setting. This argument should be 
summarily rejected as is fails to acknowledge that an employee does not decide what the 
employer's expected standard of behavior appropriately should be. Rather, the Commission 
decides what the standard established by the employer is, based on the expectations that flow 
normally from an employment relationship and that those expectations that are communicated to 
the employee. Davis v. Howard 0. Miller Co., 107 Idaho 1092, 1094,695 P.2d 1231,1233 
(1984). 
The Commission's determination that Sadid's behavior fell below the reasonable 
standards set by ISU is supported by substantial and competent evidence. Sadid's reliance upon 
various quotes from the transcript of the April 21, 2009 faculty meeting in efforts to persuade 
that his behavior was not "misconduct" as used in I.C. § 72-1366(5) is misguided. When 
considered in context and in their totality, the transcript and audio recording of the faculty 
meeting, along with the other evidence in the record, confirm that the Commission's 
determination that Sadid's behavior at the meeting violated the standards set by ISU is well-
supported by competent and substantial evidence. 
Specifically, the transcript and audio recording alone confirm that the College of 
Engineering faculty meeting held on April 21, 2009 lasted more than two hours and was replete 
with inappropriate interruptions and diatribes made by Sadid. Dean Jacobsen prepared an agenda 
of items for discussion, and the faculty also expected ISU's new Provost to address the faculty. 
Sadid's disruptions were in clear disregard of the purpose of the meeting and the reasonable 
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instructions given to him. The Provost was not present when the meeting started, so Dean 
Jacobsen moved to the next item on the agenda, which was to remind the department chairs and 
the faculty committee assigned to the task that the new College-wide faculty workload policy 
needed to be finished within two weeks. 
At approximately the 3: 15 mark of the recording, Sadid asked a question, ostensibly 
about the uses to which the workload policy would be put, but in reality he discussed a personal 
complaint about his own prior personnel evaluations. He asked Dean Jacobsen specifically, "if 
the College did not have a policy, how did you evaluate faculty?" Dean Jacobsen explained that 
the individual Departments had workload policies, and that Sadid, when he had been interim 
Chair ofthe Department of Civil Engineering, Sadid personally had used one such policy. A 
discussion between Sadid and a current Chair followed for several minutes, and at about the 
11 :30 mark, Dean Jacobson intruded and attempted to take control of the meeting, and direct the 
meeting back to the agenda. 
Dean Jacobsen went on to explain the history of workload policies at ISU and the College 
of Engineering. At about the l3:00 mark, he suggests there is no need to ascribe blame for the 
shortcomings of workload policies in the past, but the College should instead work on producing 
a policy that has some uniformity while meeting the needs of the individual Departments. At 
about 14:00, Sadid asked a question about the policy under development, which Dean Jacobsen 
answered. Sadid can then be heard, beginning at 14: 17, reciting a litany of his accomplishments 
and asking how his Department Chair, in his latest evaluation, "arrived at this decision that I 
barely meet expectations?" Sadid stated his disagreement with the metrics of his personal 
evaluation, and asserted that Dean Jacobsen was responsible for the Chair's evaluation. At 15:06, 
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Dean Jacobson again tried to redirect the meeting to the intended business, and cut Sadid off. The 
conversation went on as follows: 
Dean: "I am not going to review a single annual review in this 
meeting, a public setting - " 
Sadid: "Well, I can't help that -" 
Dean: "Nor, nor am 1 going to comment on what Dr. Zoghi's 
review of your performance for this year was about. Sorry. 
It's not a subject-" 
Sadid: "(garbled) But how can you approve of Dr. Zoghi's 
decision, based on what metric?" 
Dean: "It's not a subject for an open meeting, Habib." 
Sadid: "It is subject. When can we discuss it? You don't have any 
communication. " 
Dean: "Well that's not true, of course-" 
Sadid: "Yes, it is very true. Ask how many people think we have 
communications with Dr. Jacobson? Two? That's good." 
An argument then developed between faculty members until Dean Jacobsen cut it off at 16:20, 
Dean: "There are always things we can do better, and I'd be the 
first to admit it. Beyond that, 1 really don't think we should 
discuss a single review process here. (Inaudible objection) Now 
the workload policy is a fair subject for discussion -" 
Sadid: "I'm asking you how you arrive at the conclusions -" 
Dean: "You know, I think we should talk about the workload 
policy from the bottom up. How -" 
Sadid: "(inaudible statement; the words, "exceeds expectations" 
can be heard)" 
Dean (cutting him off): "Sorry. Go ahead." 
Female faculty member: "I'm sorry, this is my first time attending 
a meeting, but that sounds like a one-on-one personal meeting, and 
I really don't want to go through these (inaudible) things ... " 
Dean: "Yeah, this is just -" 
Sadid: "This is everybody's problem. You guys are (inaudible) 
This is everyone's problem. You are afraid to raise your voice 
because of all the retaliations." 
Discussion of the workload policy followed. At the 23 :44 mark, Sadid again raised the 
issue of how his past evaluations were performed, and the failures of the administration to 
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develop a consistent workload policy over the previous three years. During this diatribe, the 
Provost, Dr. Olson, arrived. 
Sadid still refused to adhere to the agenda and ignored specific instructions to address the 
agenda items and not to burden the entire faculty with a discussion of matters relating to specific 
personal annual perfonnance reviews, to the point that other faculty members expressed that 
raising such issues was not appropriate. Clearly, the personal grievances about administrative 
decisions voiced by Sadid during the meeting represent precisely the kind of disruptive conduct 
that ISU had warned Sadid against in the warning letters sent to him in April of 2009 regarding 
the standards of behavior he was expected to follow as an ISU faculty member. 
Furthennore, about three minutes into the Provost's presentation, another faculty member 
made a comment critical of Dean Jacobsen's duties regarding the Idaho Falls program. Sadid, 
unasked, cut off the Provost's response and spoke for nearly two minutes, concluding with, 
Sadid: "If the Administration doesn't communicate with the 
faculty, we go up the ladder, then faculty has no choice but to take 
issue public, so public can see what's going on on this campus. So 
we don't want to go there, but the Administration -" 
Provost: "Well, let me say two things about that. [Discussion of 
proposed town hall-type meetings]. So at least out of my office, 
you'll see a lot more communication. That doesn't mean 
necessarily we communicate about everything you might want. 
Because sometimes personnel, well, more often than not 
personnel-type issue you can't bring up." 
The Provost made a direct statement to Sadid that personnel issues of the type he 
regularly sought to discuss in faculty meetings were not appropriate. He went on to discuss a 
review his office was making of the College that could result in the closing of departments or of 
the entire College, and requested faculty members make their views known. 
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Sadid then launched into another monologue, unrelated to the purpose of the meeting, 
about the 20-year history of corruption at the university, the President's failure to change things, 
and the administration "lying with bold faces." He brought up his complaints again, and attacks 
of Dean Jacobsen, saying, "the Dean of the college is the Dean of these administrators who don't 
do their jobs." Again, this was precisely the kind of outburst of personal recrimination, unrelated 
to the issues established for this meeting, that Sadid had been warned against making. 
At the 1 :00:30 mark of the recording, Sadid again questioned the Provost about 
fundraising. He asked in effect whether the Provost agreed that Deans should be involved in 
raising money, and the Provost agreed. Sadid then said, "I have been at the College of 
Engineering for 22 years. In the past 14 years there have been two Deans. They haven't raised 
any money. How can you [survive?] in this environment with Deans not raising funds?" 
Again, this was the type of inappropriate attack on the integrity of another faculty 
member that Sadid was expressly asked to make through proper channels and warned not to 
make in open faculty meetings. He was also returning to the kind of backward-looking 
recriminations that were out of place in the meeting, and that neither the Dean nor the Provost 
were seeking. The Dean had previously told Sadid the purpose of the meeting was not to ascribe 
blame for the bad policies of the past, but to look forward in an effort to improve conditions. 
The Dean did not indicate his thanks for Sadid's comments. At 1 :03 :00 in the recording, 
after the Provost left the meeting, the Dean said, "Let's go back to the agenda. One of the things I 
have to say is, this is the first time I've ever heard the Dean's performance discussed in a meeting 
with the Provost in a public setting. I don't know whether that's usual at Idaho State or not. 
That's a rather interesting phenomenon." Sadid responded with an accusation about the lack of 
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communication between faculty and the administration. Beginning at 1: 11 :30, Dr. Sadid made 
another series of allegations regarding past mismanagement of the College by the two prior 
Deans. 
At the 1: 18 :00 mark, at the end of a lengthy discussion about the bad effects on the 
College of the conflicts among faculty members, Dean Jacobson suggested that Sadid's 
complaints, specifically his allegations that everyone he disagreed with was "bad" in some way, 
were not helpful to the process of improving matters in the College. Sadid again cut him off: 
Sadid: "1 have documented from [former lSU President] Bowen all 
the way down, 1 have documented that these people are unethical, 
these people are just power-hungers, they are working for their 
own interests ... " 
This continued for another two minutes. At the 1 :20:17 mark, Dean Jacobson again attempted to 
bring the meeting back to the agenda, and stated he would not discuss certain issues in that 
forum, and yet Sadid again persisted. 
As the foregoing portions of the audio recording from the April 21, 2009 faculty meeting 
show, the Commission's findings that Sadid violated the standard of behavior set by ISU is 
supported by substantial and competent evidence and is not clearly erroneous. Sadid's argument 
that the general comments by the Provost and Dean Jacobsen that they were not offended by 
anything said during the meeting and that these comments somehow negate lSU's stated 
expectations in the April of 2009 warning letters is simply not supported by the substantial and 
competent evidence relied on by the Commission. The issue clearly was whether Sadid 
continued to disrupt the College of Engineering and to waste the time ofthe entire faculty to air 
his personal grievences, even after receiving reasonable instructions to process his concerns 
through normal procedures. 
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First, Sadid has provided no legal authority for the proposition that those general 
comments could take precedence over ISU's stated expectations of Sadid set forth in the April of 
2009 warning letters. Second, the argument actually ignores Idaho case law showing that the 
standard of behavior expected by ISU of its faculty members is not measured by whether a 
particular individual may be offended, but rather on the standards of behavior communicated by 
ISU as the employer to the employee. Third, the comments made to the faculty as a whole, when 
these statements are viewed in conjunction with the other repeated requests made directly to 
Sadid to stop raising his own personal grievances, are more determinative of what those 
university officials felt about Sadid's inappropriate behavior, as the Commission found. Fourth, 
the comments relied upon by Sadid show that the university officials were merely attempting to 
be civil, to keep order, and were aimed at re-directing Sadid's complaints so that they could 
conduct the university's business. 
Further, Sadid's reference to comments made by other individuals during the meeting 
which were critical of the administration, is again of no effect or value. Sadid's employment 
was not terminated because he was critical of ISU or its administration, or anyone else for that 
matter. His termination was due to his own employment-related misconduct. Sadid simply 
refused to conduct himself so as to not waste valuable time of the entire College of Engineering. 
Again, Sadid was specifically advised, as the Commission found, that "in the future, you are 
directed to follow proper protocol in expressing your concerns (first to the Chair of the 
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, the to the Dean of the College of 
Engineering, then to Idaho State University's upper administration)." (Ex. 3, p. 28). Sadid was 
later advised, "You should not use such channels as campus-wide meetings, engineering faculty 
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meetings, and widely-distributed email communications to make negative comments about the 
performance and/or character of current and former university staff and employees .... 
Communications intended to expose another individual to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or 
to impeach his or her integrity or reputation are not appropriate. ... Continuing failure to follow 
these guidelines will be cause for disciplinary action." (Ex. 4, p. 32). ISU did not care that he 
was critical of any person, rather they, reasonably, asked him to make these comments and 
observations at times and places that did not disrupt the legitimate work of the University and his 
colleagues. 
Where the great weight of evidence in the record, including Sadid' s admissions in his 
own documents (R., pp. 65-66), demonstrates that Sadid repeatedly disregarded ISU's reasonable 
and stated expectations on his behavior, the Commission's Decision and Order on 
Reconsideration reversing the Appeals Examiner's award of unemployment benefits to Sadid 
was properly supported by substantial evidence, and it should be affirmed. 
B. THE COMMISSION PROPERLY REFUSED TO DECIDE WHAT ISU'S 
EXPECTATIONS OF APPELLANT SHOULD BE. 
Sadid's constitutional arguments have no relevance to the issues raised on this appeal. 
Specifically, Sadid argues in his Appellate Brief that the Commission should have considered, 
and found, that his behavior at the April 21, 2009 faculty meeting constituted "protected speech" 
and, therefore, that ISU's expected standards of behavior communicated to him were 
unreasonable. (Appellate Brief at 15-28). This is an argument that was never raised below until 
Sadid mentioned it in his Brief on Reconsideration to the Commission. Prior to that time he had 
argued, not that his behavior at the meeting was protected free speech, but that his speech in 
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articles over the past several years had caused two separate academic administrations to conspire 
to retaliate against him by terminating him in October of2009.4 It is well established that issues 
not raised in the court below are deemed to have been waived and such issues will not be 
considered on appeal. See Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass'n v. State, 127 Idaho 239, 245,899 P.2d 949, 
955 (1995); Matter oJEstate oj Reinwald, 122 Idaho 401, 402, 834 P.2d 1317, 1318 (1992); Sun 
Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 93, 803 P.2d 993, 998 (1991). As 
Sadid failed to properly raise the issue of the "protected status" of his speech at the faculty 
meeting with the Commission below, the issue has been waived and should not be considered on 
appeal. 
In the event the Court decides to pass on Sadid's argument that his speech at the April 21, 
2009 meeting was "protected speech" and that the Commission erred in failing to consider his 
academic freedom when determining whether he was discharged for misconduct, such argument 
is fundamentally flawed in numerous respects as addressed below. 
1. The Commission Does Not Set The Employment Standards Of The 
Employer. 
Sadid misapprehends the Commission's role in deciding whether an employee was 
terminated for misconduct pursuant to I.C. § 72-1366(5). Again, the Commission determines 
whether the employee's behavior fell below the standard expected by the employer, and whether 
the employer's expectation was objectively reasonable. Taylor v. Burley Care Ctr., 121 Idaho 
792,793; 828 P.2d 821, 822 (1991); Matthews v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 101 Idaho 657, 659,619 
40n Sadid's other pending appeal, Docket No. 37563-2010, he is taking the opposite position that the 
Notice of Contemplated Action issued by Dean Jacobsen, along with his administrative suspension 
pending the termination decision, were not done because of his "protected speech" at the April 21, 2009 
meeting, but instead, due to speech that he had made between 2001 and 2009. 
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P.2d 1110, 1112 (1980). The Commission does not decide what the standard should be, but what 
it is, based on those expectations that flow normally from an employment relationship and those 
additional expectations that are communicated to the employee. Davis v. Howard 0. Miller Co., 
107 Idaho 1092, 1094,695 P.2d 1231,1233 (1984). 
Sadid's contention that the Commission should have ignored the expectations 
communicated to him by ISU, and found that any meetings, offices, conference rooms and 
public areas on a state university campus are open forums for "academics," who, alone among 
any other public employees, enjoy a First Amendment right to speak on any and all matters 
desired without limitation by their public employers, is without merit and is unsupported by legal 
authority. See, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (2006). 
Not only did the Commission lack the authority to find in favor of Sa did on what lSU's 
reasonable expectations of behavior should be, but it would have been error for the Commission 
to do so. 
2. The First Amendment Does Not Insulate Sadid's Statements Made At The 
April 21, 2009 Faculty Meeting From Employer Discipline. 
Sadid's argument that his statements at the April 21, 2009 faculty meeting constituted 
"protected speech" and, therefore, the Commission abdicated its responsibility by failing to find 
that such statements were the type ISU should have expected from him is directly at odds with 
substantial public employee-speech jurisprudence, as this Court is aware. 
The United States Supreme Court has established tests for determining when speech by a 
public employee is a protected activity. First, not all speech is protected. Only speech in the 
capacity of a private individual, on matters of public concern, that may fairly be considered as 
relating to issues of political, social, or other concern to the community can qualify for 
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protection. And speech that relates only to matters of internal concern is not protected. Connick 
v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 141, 103 S.Ct. 1684 (1983). Second, if the speech touches a matter of 
public concern, there is a balancing of the employee's interests, as a citizen, in commenting upon 
matters of public concern, against the interests of the State, as an employer, in promoting the 
efficiency of the public services it provides through its employees. Pickering v. Board oj 
Education, 391 U.S. 563, 572-73, 88 S.Ct. 1731 (1968). Third, even if the speech touches a 
matter of public concern, the controlling factor is whether the employee's speech is made 
pursuant to his duties as a public employee and not as a private citizen. "We hold that when 
public employees make statement pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not 
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their 
communications from employer discipline." Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410,421, 126 S.Ct. 
1951 (2006); see also Eng v. Cooley, 552 F .3d 1062, 1070-72 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth the 
sequential five-step Pickering-based test adopted by the Ninth Circuit to determine whether a 
plaintiff states a valid First Amendment retaliation claim); see also Johnson v. Poway Unified 
Sch. Dist., Case No.1 0-55445 Decision Filed September 13,2011,2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 
18882 (9th Cir. Cal., 2011). Sadid met none of these standards as the record clearly shows. 
On the issue of academic freedom, Sadid again does not properly support his claims and 
misinterprets that status of the law. Notably, the Supreme Court stated as follows in the key case 
of Garcetti: 
Second, Justice Souter suggests today's decision may have 
important ramifications for academic freedom, at least as a 
constitutional value. See post, at _-_, 164 L. Ed. 2d at 712. 
There is some argument that expression related to academic 
scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional 
constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this 
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Court's customary employee-speech jurisprudence. We need not, 
and for that reason do not, decide whether the analysis we 
conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case 
involving speech related to scholarship or teaching. 
547 U.S. at 425. (Emphasis added). 
It is clear from the above quote that the Supreme Court declined to create an "academic 
freedom exception" to its public employee-speech jurisprudence in Garcetti despite Sadid's 
protestations to the contrary. It also must be emphasized that no academic freedom exception to 
Garcetti has been recognized by the Ninth Circuit. Further, only one court has found an 
academic freedom exception to Garcetti and that was for the in-class speech of a medical 
professor on academic instructional matters arguably related to "scholarship and teaching". See 
Kerr v. Hurd, 694 F .Supp.2d 817 (S.D. Ohio, 2010). (Emphasis added). No court has found an 
academic freedom exception to Garcetti for out-of-class speech such as Sadid's faculty meeting 
utterances. 
The fact is, the majority of courts faced with analyzing the speech of university professors 
have declined to afford out-of-class speech such as Sadid's any constitutional protection. Hong 
v. Grant, 516 F.Supp.2d 1158 (C.D.Cal., 2007); Ezuma v. City ofUniv. o/N.Y, 367 Fed. Appx. 
178 (2d Cir. N.Y.,2010); Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179 (3d Cir. Del.,2009); Renken v. 
Gregory, 541 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. Wis.,2008); Abcarian v. McDonald, 201 0 U.S. App. LEXIS 
16784 (7th Cir. Ill.,20 10); Colburn v. Trustees of Indiana University, 973 F .2d 581 (7th Cir. 
1992); Urojsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. Va.,2000).5 
5 See also Patera-Haskins v. Gamble, 519 F. Supp. 2d (D. Mont. 2007), affi1111ed by 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 
17077 (9th Cir. Mont. 2011), wherein the First Amendment retaliation claim ofa women's basketball coach 
at Montana State University was dismissed because her statements were not protected speech where they 
were made pursuant to her official duties. 
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Sadid ignores the foregoing professor-speech cases and Garcetti and, relying on nothing 
more than his one-sided perception of the scope of the First Amendment, he argues that academic 
freedom mandates heightened protection for any and all professor speech. He incorrectly argues 
that "academic" speech is not governed by Garcetti or the 'official duties' test set forth therein, 
but rather "a half-century of decisions recognizing the vital role that academic speech by a 
college professor plays in out society". (Appellate Brief at 24). 
Notably, in Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. Va., 2000), the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit closely analyzed and outlined the long-line of Supreme 
Court cases relied upon by Sadid and the court found that "To the extent the Constitution 
recognizes any right of "academic freedom" above and beyond the First Amendment rights to 
which every citizen is entitled, the right inheres to the University, not in individual 
professors". Id. at 409 (emphasis added). The court stated that Supreme Court jurisprudence 
referring generally to a First Amendment right to academic freedom has done so in terms of the 
institution, not the individual. ld. at 414. (Emphasis added). Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit 
recently noted that "academic speech" precedent in no way suggests that Pickering does not 
control cases of teacher speech. Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 
18882 (9th Cir. Cal., 2011).6 Sadid's argument is simply unsupported by established case law on 
this issue. 
But more, even when classroom instruction and scholarship are at issue, "academic 
freedom" does not protect an academic from all adverse employment decisions. In Evans-
6 A similarity between Sadid's faculty speech and plaintiffJohnson's in-class speech in this case is worth 
emphasizing; namely, that the speech was made to a captive audience. Johnson used his official position to 
press his particular views on captive students, while Sadid used his official position to press his personal 
views on captive school officials at the faculty meeting. 
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Marshall v. Board oJEducation, 624 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 2010), the Sixth Circuit opined that the 
concerns of academic freedom suggested in Garcetti, even if they applied to the plaintiff, a high 
school teacher, would not serve to protect her from control by her employer. Id. at 344. By going 
to work for a government-owned institution, the employee does not lose any liberty enjoyed by a 
private citizen, but by the same token the government, just like a private employer, retains 
control over the job. Id. at 342. 
Nothing about the public employee speech jurisprudence suggests that a state employer 
must accept bad behavior, couched as protected speech, from "academics" during faculty 
meetings. The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly found that speech dealing with individual personnel 
disputes and grievances is not of public concern. See Brownfield v. City oJYakima, 612 F.3d 
1140 (9th Cir. 2010); citing City oj Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, (9th Cir. 1983); see also See Hong v. 
Grant, 516 F.Supp.2d 1158 (C.D.Cal., 2007), affirmed on alternate grounds, Hong v. Grant, 
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 23504 (9th Cir. 2010). Again, in Garcetti the Supreme Court made the 
following key point: 
Underlying our cases has been the premise that while the First Amendment 
invests public employees with certain rights, it does not empower them to 
constitutionalize the employee grievance. Connick, 461 U.S., at 154. 
547 U.S. at 420. 
Where no court has ever extended the concept of academic freedom to include the right of 
a university professor to ignore reasonable procedures established by a university employer in 
order to air their own personal employee grievances, Sadid' s argument that the Commission 
should have carved out a special academic freedom exception for any and all of his utterances 
made at the faculty meeting is invalid, and simply not supported in the law. 
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It would be particularly unreasonable to expect the Commission to decide such an issue, 
since it was not raised at the hearing below, and was only raised in Sadid's Brief on 
Reconsideration, (R. at 173). Thus, there is an insufficient record regarding the speech issue for 
which this Court is expected to examine. But more, the Commission is not qualified to make 
new law as would be required by Sadid's academic freedom argument. Just as Sadid's request 
for the Commission to carve out an academic freedom exception for his faculty meeting speech is 
inappropriate, so is his request for this Court to do so when no other court has and the wide body 
of authority shows that there is no basis for making such an exception. 
3. Appellant Asks The Commission To Exceed Its Present Authority And 
Decide Wrongful Termination Claims Rather Than The Idaho Courts. 
Sadid's argument would improperly require the Commission to determine issues of 
wrongful termination in unemployment insurance cases. This is not required by I.C.§ 72-1366(5), 
nor is it the appropriate forum for deciding whether a discharge was wrongful. It has never been 
the role of the Commission in unemployment insurance disputes to determine whether the 
employee's dismissal was wrongful. The Commission's standard is not whether the employee 
was rightly or wrongly discharged for cause, but whether the cause was misconduct in connection 
with his employment. As this Court has stated, the two issues are separate. Beaty v. Idaho Falls, 
110 Idaho 891, 892, 719P.2d 1151, 1152 (1986). "[T]he issue is not whether the city had 
reasonable grounds for discharging Beaty, but rather whether those grounds constituted 
"misconduct" in connection with Beaty's employment such that he can be denied unemployment 
benefits. The two issues are separate and distinct. ... " Id. 
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Sadid has already brought other civil lawsuits in the Idaho courts claiming wrongful 
termination. On this appeal, he is claiming entitlement to unemployment benefits based upon on 
the same wrongful termination arguments. IfSadid's argument were accepted, the Commission 
would have to determine whether the employer's adoption or application of standards of 
expected conduct violates a contractual, statutory or constitutional right, or contravenes public 
policy in all future cases. This is outside the bounds of the Commission's present authority. 
Further, it would undoubtedly burden the Commission's administrative procedure. Finally, it 
would lead to piecemeal litigation, the potential for inconsistent judgments by the Commission 
and Idaho courts, and excessive appeals of wrongful termination claims. 
This is precisely why Sadid's other pending cases are of such significance. Sadid spends 
a considerable portion of his Appellate Brief (pp. 17-20) discussing the concept of res judicata 
and arguing that no court has ever decided that his First Amendment rights were not violated 
when he was terminated. ISU has never argued, and does not argue now, that decisions made in 
Sadid's other Idaho cases against Respondents controlled the Commission's decision whether he 
was terminated for employment-related misconduct within the meaning ofLC. § 72-1366(5). 
ISU has pointed to Sadid's other Idaho cases to underscore several flaws in his arguments on 
appeal. 
IfSadid's arguments carried the day, he would improperly have the Commission making 
rulings on the rightfulness or wrongfulness of his discharge at the same time that those other 
Idaho courts already have been asked, and are still being asked, to make that same 
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determination.7 But more, those other cases are important because they demonstrate that Sadid is 
playing fast and loose with the courts by making shifting allegations regarding his beliefs on the 
reasons for his discharge. Sadid originally took the position before the Appeals Examiner for the 
IDOL that his discharge was simply a pretext for retaliation in reaction to his "protected speech" 
made in articles over the past several years. This was the same argument and position taken by 
Sadid, and rejected by the Honorable David C. Nye, in the case of Sadid v. Idaho State 
University et af., In the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District in and for Bannock County, 
Case No. CV-2008-3942-0C, Docket No. 37563-2010. Again, it was only in his Brief on 
Reconsideration to the Commission that Sadid asserted that his discharge was actually due to 
"protected speech" during the faculty meeting. He is judicially estopped from taking a new 
position in this appeal than he has taken previously before the Idaho courts and the IDOL in order 
to further his interests on appeal. See Indian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land Inv., LLC, 147 
Idaho 737, 748,215 P.3d 457,468 (2009) (noting that "The doctrine of judicial estoppel 
prohibits 'a party from assuming a position in one proceeding and then taking an inconsistent 
position in a subsequent proceeding"'). 
CONCLUSION 
ISU carried its burden of showing that its reason for terminating Sadid was his 
employment-related misconduct. Sadid disregarded ISU's communicated and reasonable 
expectations of behavior as reflected by the entire record considered by the Commission, 
7 See Sadid v. Idaho State University et aI., In the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District in and for 
Bannock County, Case No. CV-2008-3942-0C, Docket No. 37563-2010; Sadidv. Idaho State 
University et aI., In the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District in and for Bannock County, Case No. 
CV -20 11-3455-0C; Sadid v. Idaho State University et aI, In the United States District Court for the District 
ofIdaho, Case No. 4:11-cv-00103-MHW. 
28 
including but not limited to the audio recording of the April 21, 2009 faculty meeting and ISU' s 
stated reasons for termination. The Commission's findings of fact are supported by substantial 
and competent evidence. Further, the Commission correctly refused to determine what ISU's 
standards of behavior from Sadid should be, or to carve out an academic freedom exception for 
his speech. This Court should similarly decline Sadid's invitation to carve out an academic 
freedom exception for his speech. Where the record supports the factual findings of the 
Commission, its Decision and Order on Reconsideration reversing the decision of the Appeals 
Examiner granting unemployment benefits to Sadid should be affirmed. 
DATED this Joti-day of November, 2011. 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE 
& BAILEY, CHARTERED 
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